

Vol. 4

# The United States Senate

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## Report of Proceedings

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Hearing held before  
Committee on Foreign Relations

HEARING REGARDING SUMMIT CONFERENCE  
OF MAY, 1960  
and Incidents Relating Thereto

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June 2, 1960

Washington, D. C.

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HEARING REGARDING SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF MAY, 1960  
AND INCIDENTS RELATING THERETO

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Thursday, June 2, 1960

United States Senate,  
Committee on Foreign Relations,  
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to recess,  
Senator F. William Fulbright (Chairman of the full Committee)  
presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright (presiding), Gore, Wiley,  
Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

Also present: Brig. Gen. G. S. Brown, USAF, Capt. Means  
Johnston, Jr., USN, Military Assistants to the Secretary of  
Defense; Capt. L. P. Gray, III, USN, Military Assistant  
to the Chairman, JCS; William B. Macomber, Department of  
State; Richard Helms, CIA; Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant  
to the Secretary of State.

Staff members present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Denney,  
Mr. Henderson and Mr. St. Claire.

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The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.

We have this morning the honorable Thomas S. Gates, Jr.,  
the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Secretary, I think you know about the regulations.  
Your testimony will be taken down but nothing will be released  
except that which has been passed by the censors representing  
the State Department and the CIA, and I assume perhaps you  
may want to advise with them.

I think you understand that.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. I understand you have a statement.

Secretary Gates. A very brief statement.

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF  
THE HONORABLE THOMAS S. GATES,  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you.

I have a short statement, if I may read it. It relates to two subjects. First, I am certain that you wish me to cover the role played by the Department of Defense in the U-2 overflight program.

Elements of the Department of Defense gave technical advice to the U-2 project. No military aircraft were used for these flights nor were the pilots military personnel.

From time to time, the Director of the CIA, after obtaining the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, recommended a series of programs to the President.

More specifically, I reviewed program proposals embracing several priority missions, one or more of which it was proposed to execute in the near future. Responsibility for the operational conduct of the program rested with the CIA.

We obviously were interested in the results of these flights as we are in all of our nation's intelligence collection results.

For example, from these flights we got information on

airfields, aircraft, missiles, missile testing and training, special weapons storage, submarine production, atomic production and aircraft deployments and things like these.

These were all types of vital information. These results were considered in formulating our military programs. We obviously were the prime customer and ours is the major interest.

Secondly, on a separate subject --

One incident, and one over which I assume full responsibility, is the calling of a test of the readiness of our military communications from Paris. In view of the fact that my action in this matter has been subject to some speculation, I would like to give you the facts.

First of all, our military forces are always on some degree of alert. So it is merely a matter of moving this degree or condition of alert up or down the scale. On Sunday night (May 15) we were already aware of the sense of the statement which Mr. Khrushchev was going to make the following morning. The conditions which he had set for his participation in the Conference made it apparent even at the time that he deliberately intended to wreck the Conference.

This communications alert was not an act that was either offensive or defensive in character. It was a sound precautionary measure. It did not recall Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine personnel from leave. There was no movement of forces involved. However, I want to emphasize that it did

make certain that if subsequent developments made necessary a higher state of readiness, such action could be taken promptly and convincingly.

Under the circumstances it seemed most prudent to me to increase the awareness of our unified commanders. Moreover, since the command and individuals concerned in the decision process, including the President, the Secretary of State, and myself, were overseas it was important to check out our military communications. At about midnight, Paris time, Sunday night, I requested that a quiet increase in command readiness, particularly with respect to communications, be instituted without public notice, if possible.

One phase of our testing is to call no-notice exercises of our command communications. While some commands went further in executing the instructions issued by the JCS as a result of my message than I had anticipated, I consider the order proper and absolutely essential. In similar circumstances I would take exactly the same action.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Secretary, did you or any of your aides participate in any conference prior to May the 1st regarding the U-2 flights?

(At this point, Senator Young, of Ohio, entered the hearing room.)

Secretary Gates. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I was, some weeks before May 1st briefed on the preliminary results of the April 9th flight. At that time, I was informed a program of possible flights, one of which would be selected to be flown, and I gave my approval on that program.

The Chairman. Was anything said at that time about a moratorium in view of the Summit Conference?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

The Chairman. Who participated in that conference?

Secretary Gates. That conference was in my office in the Pentagon, and was between myself and a man from CIA.

The Chairman. Was anyone in the State Department present?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

The Chairman. Do you know whether the State Department was advised specifically of the plans for the May 1st flight?

Secretary Gates. I don't know from my own knowledge, but I am perfectly certain that the Secretary of State was advised of the program as I was.

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The Chairman. You didn't advise him nor was he represented at that meeting?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

The Chairman. And no one raised the question of whether or not there should be a suspension?

Secretary Gates. No, sir. In this conversation, it was a private conversation between the CIA representative

and myself, and I was asked for my advice on approval of the program and I gave it.

The Chairman. I understand that, but I merely meant that the question of whether or not there should be a suspension in view of the upcoming Summit was not raised, is that correct?

Secretary Gates. Not raised between the two of us, no, sir.

The Chairman. Was it raised at any time?

Secretary Gates. I didn't have any other discussions about the flight with anyone, Senator Fulbright.

The Chairman. Then so far as you know, it was not raised?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. To your knowledge, were any flights prior thereto ever suspended because of political meetings, that is other than weather or military considerations?

Secretary Gates. I have no knowledge of any suspension



3 of any flights for those purposes.

The Chairman. There was no suspension to your knowledge when the Camp David meeting took place?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

The Chairman. Now was there any suspension, so far as you know, during the period in which Khrushchev visited the United States?

Secretary Gates. I don't know of any suspension. I don't know precisely whether during that period we flew any flights, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. No, but I mean you didn't discuss the question?

Secretary Gates. I didn't discuss the question of suspension of flights, no, sir.

The Chairman. Since you never considered it, then you had no position relative to the continuation, did you?

Secretary Gates. I approved this program, so I took a position affirmatively.

The Chairman. Were the results as I take it from your initial statement, the results of these flights were important to the Defense Department?

Secretary Gates. The results were very important to the Defense Department.

The Chairman. Very useful to you?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

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The Chairman. Do you regard it as an important loss that the flights have now been suspended?

Secretary Gates. I think that it has by becoming compromised, has removed an important source of intelligence that has been a very successful program over the past.

(At this point, Senator Mansfield entered the hearing room.)

The Chairman. Then it is a great loss from your point of view not to have available any further flights, is that correct?

Secretary Gates. I think if we had been able to continue them without having been caught and therefore compromised the source, it would have been most useful.

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The Chairman. Well, Mr. Gates, did Khrushchev, the Russians, know of overflights prior to May 1?

Secretary Gates. He says he did.

The Chairman. Well, what do you think?

Secretary Gates. I believe that he did, Mr. Chairman, but I don't believe anyone could specifically prove it. But I believe that he did. I believe he told the truth.

The Chairman. If he knew about it, why did the incidents of May 1 compromise the flights, why should they be discontinued?

Secretary Gates. Well, I don't believe he knew the exact type and character of the flights. He probably -- all he knew was that they were aircraft high above his sky.

The Chairman. On your order on May 15, your alert, did you consult the Department of State before ordering it?

Secretary Gates. No. I advised the Secretary of State, who was with the President at the same place that I was when it was issued.

The Chairman. Did you advise him before you issued it?

Secretary Gates. He was advised before it was released yes, sir.

The Chairman. Was his opinion asked or was he merely advised of it?

Secretary Gates. Well, I told him that I was about to issue a communications alert, and the communication readiness exercise.

The Chairman. He approved of it.

Secretary Gates. He did not register any disapproval.

The Chairman. Well then he approved it.

Secretary Gates. I think so, yes, sir.

The Chairman. Was that Mr. Herter?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. In Paris.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Did you advise the President?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Before it was made?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Was the NSC consulted about the alert?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

The Chairman. Mr. Gates, did you participate in any meeting on May 7 to consider the statement which was later issued by the Secretary of State?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

The Chairman. Or on May 9?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

On May 9th, that is Monday, I believe, I participated in a meeting in the office of the Secretary of State.

On the morning of the 9th.

The Chairman. Did you approve of the statement made in which the full revelation was made?

Secretary Gates. I approved of the statement that was made on May 9, yes, sir.

The Chairman. Who was present at that meeting?

Secretary Gates. Well, I know that Mr. Douglas and myself were present from the Department of Defense. Mr. Herter and Mr. Douglas Dillon, and Mr. Kohler were present, I think Mr. Bohlen were present from the State Department, there may have been one or two others.

The Chairman. Did that meeting go on for some time?

Secretary Gates. I would say about an hour.

The Chairman. About an hour.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Was the question of whether or not it was wise for the President to take responsibility discussed at that meeting?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. What was your position?

Secretary Gates. My position was that he should take responsibility.

The Chairman. Was the meeting unanimous?

Secretary Gates. I believe it was.

The Chairman. They all agreed?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. It went on about an hour.

Secretary Gates. Well, I would say at least an hour, Senator.

The Chairman. Well, did it go on more than an hour?

Secretary Gates. Well, I am talking about my recollection. I would think it was at least one hour. Perhaps it was longer.

The Chairman. Was the statement issued by the NASA organization on May 5, was that cleared with your office?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

The Chairman. You didn't know anything about it.

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

The Chairman. Have you had any relations with NASA?

Secretary Gates. No, sir, not in this connection.

The Chairman. I mean in connection with the U-2 flight.

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

The Chairman. These U-2 flights, were they under your direct control in the field, that is under the Air Force direct control in the field?

Secretary Gates. No, sir, they were under the control of the --

The Chairman. How did it happen the Air Force made the initial statement of the missing plane?

Secretary Gates. That was a part of the cover story that was decided upon and they issued this statement from the base in Turkey about a plane being missing.

The Chairman. Well, does that indicate that you had arrived ahead of time in concert with the CIA upon proper procedure to be followed in case of a mishap?

Secretary Gates. I was not familiar with the details of how a cover story would be executed. I was aware of the fact that a cover story existed, and I imagine that when the details of it were put into operation, the Central Intelligence Agency went to work.

The Chairman. It wasn't your responsibility, it was not your responsibility to supervise the cover story.

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

The Chairman. My time is up. Senator Gore?

Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, you are a member of the National Security Council.

Secretary Gates. That is right, Senator.

Senator Gore. Did you attend the meeting of the council held on May 5?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Gore. Did the President participate in that conference?

Secretary Gates. At the meeting of the NSC?

Senator Gore. Yes.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Gore. Was the cover story discussed there?

Secretary Gates. No.

Senator.

There was a meeting of the small group after the NSC meeting.

Senator Gore. Did you participate?

Secretary Gates. With the President, where we discussed the Khrushchev statement and I participated in that, with the President. It was not at the NSC meeting.

Senator Gore. At this conference in which Mr. Khrushchev's speech was discussed, was the cover story discussed?

Secretary Gates. Well, I think it was discussed in a general manner but not in detail. It was decided at that meeting that the responsibility for all releases pertaining to this matter would be handled by the Department of State.

Senator Gore. Was there any discussion at this meeting of the advisability of telling the truth?

Secretary Gates. I think I made a statement in that meeting, something to the effect that the prestige of the Presidency should not be involved in an international lie particularly when it would not stand up with respect to the facts.

But that was the extent of the discussion. There was no decision.

Senator Gore. After this observation on your part, the State Department did issue a statement that was not true,



is that the case?

Secretary Gates. I think --

Senator Gore. Well, the record shows --

Secretary Gates. I think they issued a statement, that is right. I think they issued a part of the cover story statement after that meeting, yes, sir.

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Senator Gore. So no decision -- although the question of the involvement of the Presidency in what you call an international lie, was discussed, and you expressed your view that it would be an unwise thing to involve the President in the cover story or in an international -- an official falsehood?

Secretary Gates. If it turned out that Mr. Khrushchev had all the facts, which we subsequently found out that he had, yes.

Senator Gore. How did you think his involvement or his association with this incident in its ramifications could be avoided by an assumption of responsibility by the President for the program.

Secretary Gates. I believe the President did assume responsibility, and I believe he should have assumed responsibility.

Senator Gore. Well, let's see, let me see if I understand you correctly. I certainly do not wish to make any implication at all. I do not wish to impute to you any meaning which you did not intend. Did I correctly understand you to say that this question was discussed at a small meeting following the NSC meeting on the 5th at which you participated as did the President?

Secretary Gates. That is correct, sir.

Senator Gore. Who else participated?

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Secretary Gates. Mr. Douglas Dillon, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Gordon Gray and General Goodpaster.

Senator Gore. At this meeting, you expressed the view that it would be unwise for the President to be involved in an international lie, I believe you described it.

Secretary Gates. That is right. This depended on what Mr. Khrushchev knew and when he knew it and if he knew everything that he claimed to know, and it turned out later he did, I believe that the President should take the responsibility for the truth, for telling the truth. That is my opinion. I did not know specifically at that time the extent of Mr. Khrushchev's knowledge.

Senator Gore. You have amended your --

Secretary Gates. I didn't mean to be evasive, Senator.

Senator Gore. I understand, but you have now amended, and I would like to clarify, if I may.

Secretary Gates. I was talking --

Senator Gore. I know you are not trying to be evasive and I assure you that I am only seeking to develop the facts.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Gore. As they existed, and the Government has full leeway, so far as I am concerned, to exercise censorship for security.

Now, when you expressed the view that the Presidency should

3 not be involved in an international lie, did you at that time, on the 5th, suggest the President should assume responsibility or was this on the 7th or the 9th that you expressed that additional view?

Secretary Gates. It was on the -- I had no more meetings on the subject until the 9th, Senator. That meeting was with the Secretary of State.

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Senator Gore. Did you express the view on the 5th that the President should assume responsibility or did you express that view on the 9th?

Secretary Gates. I expressed the view on the 5th that if Mr. Khrushchev had the complete information and the pilot, that the President should assert the true story.

I expressed it again on the 9th when we knew that he had the plane and the pilot.

Senator Gore. You were informed that Mr. Khrushchev had made the public speech with respect to the plane that it was shot down or that it came down in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk?

Secretary Gates. Yes. I am not sure of my timing, Senator. We knew some information on the 5th, but we knew a great deal more a day later. He didn't report the full story until the 7th.

Senator Gore. I understand. I am only trying to develop the background of information.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

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Senator Gore. And then the decision that was made.

Although you express these views, and although this information was in the hands or was discussed in the conference --

Secretary Gates. Some information was in our hands.

Senator Gore. The information which you have described?

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Senator Gore. I am perfectly willing for you to describe it.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Gore. I have no description of it except as you give it to me. The decision was not reached at this meeting?

Secretary Gates. That is correct.

Senator Gore. A decision to tell the truth was not reached at this meeting on the 5th?

Secretary Gates. That is right, Senator. The only decision that was reached at that meeting was that all the statements pertaining to the incident would be handled by the Department of State.

Senator Gore. What information was the State Department to give? Was it specifically understood at the meeting that the cover story would be continued?

Secretary Gates. Yes, I think it was assumed that the cover story would be continued.

Senator Gore. And the --

Secretary Gates. At that time.

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Senator Gore. And the cover story was untrue?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. It turned out to be untrue. I mean, yes, because it was untrue. We didn't have the full facts that we later had two days later.

The Chairman. The Senator's time has expired.

The Senator from Wisconsin.

Senator Wiley. Mr. Secretary, I have listened to this interrogation. Now see if you can't tell us the story without questioning, starting in when you first became acquainted with the facts, who was there, what was said, and then go on.

For instance, we have heard so many statements about something not being true. Now this release on May 5th, it was the cover story, wasn't it?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. When did you first get acquainted with the situation? Start in the beginning and give it consecutively so that it will be clear.

(At this point in the proceedings, Senator Carlson leaves the hearing room.)

Secretary Gates. I first got involved in the situation when the airplane did not return to base and I knew an airplane was down, presumably because it hadn't come back and it had taken off and that was on May 1st.

I had no other relationship with it until the morning of Thursday, which was May 5th when we had an meeting of

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the NSC at a remote location under a Civil Defense Exercise.

On that morning, there was the preliminary statements of Mr. Khrushchev that we had been flying over his territory, and so forth.

After the NSC meeting, there was a small meeting at which I have listed the members present, in which we discussed this matter.

Senator Wiley. Who was there?

Secretary Gates. Mr. Dillon of the State Department, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster and myself and the President and we discussed this whole matter and we made the decision there that the matter would be handled by the Department of State, and we adjourned.

I had no further participation or discussion concerning the incident until the following Monday morning.

Senator Wiley. What date?

Secretary Gates. Which was the 9th.

Senator Wiley. The 9th?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. It was then that the Secretary of the State Department issued the --

Secretary Gates. I at that time participated in a meeting in the office of the Secretary of State, and he issued his complete statement.

Senator Wiley. Have you got one of these pamphlets in



front of you?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. Turn to page 4 and see if we can't get into the record -- that which is on page 4, is that the cover story, up at the top, for the press?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. And that is the one that had been said was a lie?

Secretary Gates. This was a covery story, yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. What I am getting at is that that is when you had only part of the facts, isn't that it?

Secretary Gates. That is right.

Senator Wiley. On May 9th, if you will turn to page 5, you have got the Department of State's release.

The Chairman. Page 6.

Senator Wiley. 5 and 6.

Secretary Gates. Press release of May 6th, on page 5.

Senator Wiley. The Department of State's press release. No, that is May 6th. Where is the May 9th? Was there one issued on May 9th?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir,

Senator Wiley. At any of these meetings was the President there?

Secretary Gates. The only meeting the President attended was the meeting of May 5th, after the NSC meeting.

Senator Wiley. I didn't understand. Was he there on the 5th?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, after the NSC meeting. That is the only meeting at which he was present.

Senator Wiley. When it was decided to have the alert, was that the judgment of all that it was in the interest of the national defense?

Secretary Gates. It was my judgment and I was responsible.

Senator Wiley. You had in mind, did you, what the condition of this country was at the time of Pearl Harbor, how we were asleep?

Secretary Gates. I certainly did.

Senator Wiley. During negotiations.

Secretary Gates. I did, indeed.

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Senator Wiley. Is it your judgment from the facts that when Khrushchev went to Paris that he had already made up his mind to call off the summit meeting?

Secretary Gates. Yes, it is my judgment, Senator.

Senator Wiley. Something was said by yourself in the cross-examination to the effect that you claimed they should tell the truth. Where was that, was that on the 5th?

Secretary Gates. I said on the 5th, if it proved that Mr. Khrushchev had the pilot, had the equipment, had the full and complete story that then it later turned out that he had, that I believed we should tell the truth at that time.

(At this point, Senator Gore left the hearing room.)

Senator Wiley. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Mansfield?

Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, since you have become Secretary of Defense, you have made it a point to sit in on the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and if an agreement could not be reached you make the final decision.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Mansfield. In that period you have also brought about reforms and increased the efficiency of the centralized purchasing system.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Mansfield. In that period you have also brought

about a centralization of the communications system.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Mansfield. For all those you are to be most highly commended because I think they were reforms long overdue and it was about time they were put into effect.

Now, at the time you issued your alert of the communications system in Paris did you have any information that Soviet forces were massing or mobilizing?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

Senator Mansfield. Did anyone person or any group ask you to order the alert?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

Senator Mansfield. You did that entirely on your own responsibility?

Secretary Gates. That is correct, Senator.

Senator Mansfield. Did the alert order which you issued put the forces of this country at a war readiness level?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

(At this point, Senator Long entered the hearing room.)

Senator Mansfield. There was no call back of reserves or cancellation of leaves to any extent.

Secretary Gates. No, sir. There was in one or two instances worldwide some people who interpreted the JCS order as meaning that they would have a couple of more aircraft on

alert, and in that case, they, on their own, recalled, I believe some pilots who were home or off duty to have approximately two more airplanes on an alert status. But this was done on their own, testing their own alert procedures under the broad order that was issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It was not the intention of this order to move forces in any way.

Senator Mansfield. Now that JCS order was in response to your order?

Secretary Gates. That is right, Senator.

Senator Mansfield. Is there any connection between this communications alert and the recent centralization of the communications system?

Secretary Gates. No, sir, because that will not be in effect in its entirety for approximately nine months.

Senator Mansfield. Now, during the course of your responses to Senator Gore, you mentioned the following words, "The prestige of the Presidency should not be involved."

Isn't it true that in almost any undertaking in a general way the prestige of the Presidency is always involved under our constitutional system of government?

Secretary Gates. Certainly.

Senator Mansfield. What I am getting at there is this: That whether or not he had any specific knowledge of this

particular flight or of this particular order, which you issued, that nevertheless under our system he is generally responsible for actions undertaken by the head of the CIA and for actions and orders issued by the Secretary of Defense, is that correct?

Secretary Gates. He is the head of the Executive Branch and he is Commander in Chief, Senator, so of course he is responsible in that sense.

Senator Mansfield. Yes, he is generally responsible.

Secretary Gates. Certainly.

Senator Mansfield. He is Commander in Chief and Chief of State.

Secretary Gates. That is right.

Senator Mansfield. There has been something said about a cover story and the fact that it is not truthful. Well, isn't a cover story by its very nature almost always a lie?

Secretary Gates. Yes, Senator.

Senator Mansfield. That is the purpose, to seek protection in some kind of a story under a given circumstance so that for the time being at least the situation could be taken care of.

Secretary Gates. That is correct, Senator.

Senator Mansfield. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, I believe that

we have had repeated statements from the Kremlin in the last months, weeks or even years that contained threats of what the Kremlin is ready to do to the West generally or to the United States under a variety of conditions, isn't that correct?

Secretary Gates. Yes, it is.

Senator Hickenlooper. I believe Mr. Khrushchev has been quoted as saying that he would bury us, whether he meant economically or militarily might be argued, and I believe he stated that they have missiles on the launching pads directed at various countries of Europe as well as the United States?

Secretary Gates. That is right.

Senator Hickenlooper. Those statements have been reported, have they not?

Secretary Gates. That is right.

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Senator Hickenlooper. Are the Russians still engaging in scramble operations and massive airflight operations over East Germany, do you know?

Secretary Gates. I don't know of any flights over East Germany recently, but, of course, they have some 20 divisions in East Germany.

Senator Hickenlooper. I don't know whether this comes within your time or not, but I have heard in one way or another in times past that they have repeatedly had large air forces in the air over East Germany, large military --

Secretary Gates. They have large air forces stationed in East Germany.

Senator Hickenlooper. I mean in the air.

Secretary Gates. They have had maneuvers, yes, sir.

Senator Hickenlooper. They have had maneuvers toward the West German border which come very close to the West German border on occasion?

Secretary Gates. They have had them regularly, yes, sir.

Senator Hickenlooper. That sometimes these are rather massive maneuvers in the air?

Secretary Gates. I believe that is correct, yes, sir.

Senator Hickenlooper. Well, now, recently we have heard a great deal of discussion and argument about keeping all of our strategic Air Force planes or a great many of them in the air all the time, there have been some that have advocated



2           that and criticized us for not keeping our airplanes in the air more than we have.

Secretary Gates. I am very familiar with this argument, with the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee.

Senator Hickenlooper. I presume you do not see anything unwarranted about this air alert which you ordered, but I will ask you the question anyway, do you see any reason for criticism because of a demonstration by your Department of a world-wide air alert of our forces?

Secretary Gates. I stated when I got off the airplane and was asked the question by the press on my return, I said I believe it was incredible to me that anybody would question it.

Senator Hickenlooper. Well, I agree with that statement, but there seems to be some criticism nevertheless.

Now, on the question of whether or not, that is from your viewpoint, in your Department, the particular U-2 flight should have been cancelled on the 30th of April or the 1st of May or whenever it occurred, isn't that a political question and not a military question?

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Senator Hickenlooper. That is in view of the so-called Summit Conference?

Secretary Gates. Yes.

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Senator Hickenlooper. That becomes exclusively a political question as to whether or not it was advisable at that time from the standpoint of the Summit Conference?

Secretary Gates. That is correct.

Senator Hickenlooper. And I take it that from the standpoint of primary responsibility you have nothing to say about whether it would be cancelled or not as a political gesture in view of a political conference?

Secretary Gates. Well, I, of course, knew of the date of the summit meeting, and if I had had a strong conviction about it I would have said it even though I didn't have the responsibility for the decision. I was in an advisory capacity, but I believed that there was really no good time to stop the collection of important information. There is always some international conference or something.

Senator Hickenlooper. What I am trying to get at is do you have any primary responsibility for making political decisions or is yours military decisions?

Secretary Gates. No, my responsibility is with the Department of Defense.

Senator Hickenlooper. Now, these U-2 flights have been extremely valuable in the securing of intelligence, have they not?

Secretary Gates. They have indeed, Senator.

Senator Hickenlooper. They have also been very valuable

4 in securing weather information, have they not?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Hickenlooper. Do you believe that in view of the general tensions that exist and the rather jingoist

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statements, let's say, that have been emanating from the Kremlin from time to time, that it was a beneficial thing to do to have this air alert as not only a show of strength but as an assurance to our friends and allies over the world that we had a readiness capability?

Secretary Gates. I do. It was not an air alert, Senator.

Senator Hickenlooper. Sir?

Secretary Gates. It was not an air alert. I think you miss -- technically, you said air alert. It was a command readiness and communications alert. I agree, however, with what you said that it was a good thing to do.

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Senator Hickenlooper. I shall adopt your description for my question then, on that point.

But anyway, it was a show of ability on our part in connection with our alertness, general alertness and our ability to put a defensive force into the air in a short time?

Secretary Gates. Yes, and we could go from there to further measures if we needed to, but this was primarily a measure of checking command and checking communications, particularly as I said in my statement, in view of the fact that the persons involved in important policy decisions were out of the country.

Senator Hickenlooper. Would you agree that it either does have or should have a certain degree of comforting effect upon not only our own country but upon our Allies that we do have these capabilities?

Secretary Gates. I would hope it would, Senator. It seems to me this is our responsibility, to be ready and alert under these circumstances at all times, and we always are.

This was merely a matter of degree. It was a little increase in the degree of alertness. We are in an alert condition at all times.

As of midnight last night we are having another communications exercise, starting at 11 o'clock last night, and it is going for several days.

Senator Hickenlooper. This fact that we may be always

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alert sometimes is not fully appreciated except occasional demonstrations of that.

Secretary Gates. This is right, and the Joint Chiefs, as a result of this experience and critique of it have recommended to me that we have these alerts on a no-notice basis more frequently.

Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you. My time is up.

The Chairman. The Senator's time is up.

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Senator Long. Did you advise or consult as to whether we were to admit that we authorized these flights if and when the Soviets did succeed in bringing one of our planes down?

Secretary Gates. If we should continue them or not?

Senator Long. No, no. What I meant is this: As a matter of forehandedness -- I see a Naval officer sitting behind you -- they taught me the definition of that word as a Midshipman. I am sure that you anticipated that sooner or later, they were going to bring one of our planes down.

Secretary Gates. We knew it was a dangerous occupation,

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yes, Senator.

Senator Long. You could anticipate that sooner or later one of these planes was going to fall into enemy hands?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Long. There was a distinct possibility at any moment, and had you advised and consulted as to how this matter should be handled if and when such an event materialized?

Secretary Gates. No, I had not, Senator. I was only aware of the fact that a cover story existed, but I had no part in it.

Senator Long. And you had not been advised as to what the position of this country was going to be in the event that that happened?

Secretary Gates. No, sir, this was not my responsibility.

Senator Long. Senator Young passed up two questions he would like for me to ask. I will just ask them on my time since I have no further questions.

He says if it were essential --

The Chairman. I think the Senator ought to ask in his own name.

Senator Long. May I yield the remainder of my time to Senator Young then?

The Chairman. No, you may not. You may ask any question you, yourself, but on your own responsibility.

Senator Long. If it were essential or important that the



U-2 flights be made for years, right up to and including May 1, is the defense of the United States adversely effected by an absolute discontinuance on May 13?

Secretary Gates. We have lost, through compromise, an important source of information.

Senator Long. In other words, we do badly need the same information that we were gathering with the U-2 flights?

Secretary Gates. We need a continuity of this information I think, Senator.

(At this point in the proceedings, Senator Morse enters the hearing room.)

Senator Long. Then if that be the case, in your judgment was it essential or advisable that the flight of May 1 should not have been cancelled?

Secretary Gates. In my judgment, it was proper to fly the flight of May 1.

Senator Long. Thank you. I have no further questions.

The Chairman. Is that all?

The Senator from Vermont.

Senator Aiken. Mr. Secretary, at the time you ordered the communications alert on May 15th, did you have any apprehension at that time that the Communists might be considering or planning surprise action in any part of the world?

Secretary Gates. No, sir, I felt that the situation was

one that was at best, not very constructive. We knew the sense of Mr. Khrushchev's remarks, but I did not anticipate a surprise attack.

I didn't order that kind of an alert.

(At this point in the proceedings, Senator Long leaves the hearing room.)

Senator Aiken. In other words, it seemed like a good thing to do at the time?

Secretary Gates. I think it was, yes, sir.

Senator Aiken. Was the response to the order fully satisfactory?

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Senator Aiken. Have you had any similar alerts since?

Secretary Gates. I testified a minute ago I believe, that we started one at 11 o'clock last night which will run for several days.

(Pages 583-584-585 & 586 deleted)

The Chairman. Senator Morse.

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary if this has been covered please tell me.

Secretary Gates. Yes, Senator.

Senator Morse. I am somewhat concerned about the implications, propagandawise and otherwise, of the alleged threat of the Marshal of the Air Forces of the Soviet Union that if they know that another spy plane is leaving a foreign base the instructions are to shoot a missile to that base. What is your judgment as to the seriousness of that threat?

Do you think it is a bluff or do you think that he means it?

Secretary Gates. Well, Senator, this is awfully hard to know. He must know that if he did such a thing that we Allied have Allied commitments. If it was a country, for example, he would be starting a very major problem for himself.

Senator Morse. That is the point I want to raise.

Secretary Gates. And this would only be done with the assumption that he would take the consequences of an act that would probably start a general war

Senator Morse. I don't see how we can either. Doesn't it seem to imply, Mr. Secretary, that if he is not bluffing, that they thereby mean to start a general war over espionage activity on the part of the United States or any other foreign power that sends a spy plane over their territory?

Doesn't that seem to be --

Secretary Gates. If I understand your question, Senator, I think he must take the responsibility of starting a general war or very likely starting a general war if he hits one of our allied bases for any reason.

Senator Morse. Could it possibly imply that the Russians are of the opinion that our power of both defense and aggression is such that they are willing to take it on? To put my question a different way --

Secretary Gates. I doubt very much that they are willing to take it now. I think they absolutely know they will commit suicide the moment they try it because I think they are fully informed in every way possible about the practical exact defense posture of the United States.

Senator Morse. If that is true, and I think it is true, that they ought to know that if they get involved in a nuclear war there can't be any victory for them, and I doubt if there could for us, but apparently this type of military mind in Russia possessed by their Air Marshal, is ready to start a nuclear war. Wouldn't that be a fair

deduction from this threat unless it is a bluff.

Secretary Gates. I think it is part, myself, Senator Morse, I think it is a part of a stepped up cold war aggressive propaganda, that is what I think it really is, because I don't believe that Mr. Khrushchev wants to start a war which he knows will be the end of his country.

Senator Morse. I am inclined to think that is probably true of Khrushchev. But the reason I am asking this line of questions is to find out from you if the leaders in our country have reason to believe that Khrushchev is being pushed in Russia by a preventive war group that entertain the point of view that sooner or later they are going to have to fight the United States, and that they think probably now is a better time to do it than later.

Do we have any intelligence information that would justify our believing that a military group in Russia are now taking over and pushing Khrushchev to the side?

Secretary Gates. We do not have. We have only the ability at this time to speculate, and there is a strong indication that this is one of the -- this might be possible, that the military group have come into more power in Russia or that Mr. Khrushchev may have had some of his power diluted. This is, however, just speculation, and it is, I suppose, rather dangerous to speculate, but we do not have any hard facts on the subject.

Senator Morse. I understand they have some 200 and 50 thousand military officers, Army and Naval and Air. Could it be possible that within the military in Russia they see the possibility of reaching an agreement on total disarmament which means that they would be moved out of the very favored position in Russian society they now occupy, and that we need to be on the alert to the possibility that a great military change is taking place in Russia by, in the form of a military hierarchy taking over control from the Communist leadership.

Secretary Gates. Well, I couldn't agree with you more, sir, that we should certainly be on the alert to this possibility and continuously so. I agree that we must consider this as one of the possibilities.

Senator Morse. What concerns me is that as far as their leadership is concerned and as far as I have any reason to believe, based upon the briefings we have had from our own American leaders, we are dealing with a group of very amoral leaders in Russia and when you get amoral leaders among the military establishments, such as they have, I think we have cause to concern as to whether or not even in desperation they might not be willing to start a war, and if this is more than propaganda, if this is more than bluff, if this is more than what you suggest might be the case of a new step up in the cold war to try

to frighten our allies, then we have to take a long look, it seems to me, as to our responsibility to history in respect to following an espionage course that might cause these amoral men in desperation to start a war because there is always the hope on our part that we may be able to contain them until we can negotiate through the United Nations a workable and enforceable total disarmament program.

I have raised this question because I don't think that in terms of history we can completely ignore our responsibility in dealing with a group of desperadoes such as I think the Russian military people are, and so it raises the question how far can we justify going morally, in connection with an espionage system such as the U-2 system, when we know we are dealing with a group of amoral military leaders in Russia who might start a nuclear war because of their complete lack of appreciation for the value of human life.

It puts us in a difficult position, it seems to me. We have our own security to protect, we have our duty to gather information, but the nature of the "beast" with whom we are dealing, in quotation marks, I put the word, of course, nevertheless puts upon us some responsibility, it seems to me, to not go too far in our own espionage program if by going a certain distance might indirectly put us in a position where history might record that we knew we were

dealing with that kind of a gang and knowing it we nevertheless followed an espionage course of action that they considered so violated their sovereign rights that they were willing then to take that last step into a nuclear war.

Secretary Gates. Well, the Senator can speculate more intelligently, I am sure, than I can on military people.

Senator Morse. Not at all.

Secretary Gates. But basically military people are conservative, worldwide, and basically they are well informed on military matters, and therefore, the military in the Soviet Union should know better than the political leaders that they will be lost, and slaughtered and devastated in a nuclear war.

On the other question, it seems to me again as a lay person that our survival is at stake. If he threatens us, I have repeatedly testified in Congress that I didn't think he intended to make any significant concessions at any meeting, that we have not prepared our defense program on that basis, that we had to keep it under continuous review, at all times, and with a completely closed country, and our survival threatened, if he builds up a capability for a surprise attack, it seems to me absolutely vital that we obtain all the information we can from every source.



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Senator Morse. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. The Senator from Indiana.

Senator Capehart. I have no questions except I think you did the right thing by ordering the laert.

I hope that you will continue to be on alert. I hope you will continue to get intelligence on Russia in every conceivable way we can

The Chairman. Is that all?

The Senator from Ohio.

Senator Lausche. Mr. Gates, how long have you been the Secretary of Defense?

Secretary Gates. Only since last December, sir.

Senator Lausche. Were you in the Department prior to that time?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, I have been there since 1953 in the Department.

Senator Lausche. In what capacity?

Secretary Gates. I was Undersecretary of the Navy, then Secretary of the Navy, then Deputy Secretary of the Navy.

Senator Lausche. Based upon your knowledge, when did the Soviet hierarchy first know of the fact that there were foreign planes flying over the Soviet?

Secretary Gates. I don't think we can confirm, Senator. We just have to take Mr. Khrushchev's statements at face value.

I think that it is debatable how much he knew. I assume he knew that there were planes flying. He said he knew. He says

t7 s2 he had known since he was here in the United States. But I don't think we can definitely confirm this.

(At this point in the proceedings, Senator Cooper enters the hearing room.)

Senator Lausche. Testimony has been given by some witness that I think on July 2nd, 1956, he made a protest that there was a plane overhead in the Soviet.

Secretary Gates. Yes. I have the record of this. I believe this was the time General Twining visited the Soviet Union. They made a public protest of overflights in July of 1956.

Senator Lausche. And since that time, U-2's have been making missions over the Soviet?

Secretary Gates. That is correct, Senator.

Senator Lausche. And Khrushchev, after May 1st, made a statement that he knew at the time that he was at Camp David that planes were flying overhead?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, he did.

Senator Lausche. Then the proof indicates that at the time he was invited to the United States, at the time he went to Camp David, and at the time that he arranged for the Summit Conference, he knew of these planes being overhead?

Secretary Gates. Yes.

Senator Lausche. And he did nothing about it.

Can a staff member tell?

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Secretary Gates. I can't say that we can confirm this, Senator.

Senator Lausche. I understand.

Secretary Gates. This is his statement.

Senator Lausche. That is correct. When was Khrushchev in the United States?

Mr. Marcy. September, 1959.

Secretary Gates. September 15 through the 27th.

Senator Lausche. He made no statement to the President at that time about planes being overhead?

Secretary Gates. He did not.

Senator Lausche. And he agreed to meet at the Summit?

Secretary Gates. That is right.

Senator Lausche. Then on May 1st, this U-2 was brought down in the Soviet and he then made these declarations that had been reported. That is correct, isn't it?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Lausche. Now then, what, in your opinion, motivated him in agreeing to have a Summit Conference, excepting our invitation to come to the United States, meeting with the President, while he knew that this supposed grave transgression of his rights was taking place?

Secretary Gates. I can only hazard again a personal opinion, Senator.

My opinion is that he believed that he could not make any

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progress at the Summit meeting, and he made a pre-positioned, he took a pre-position -- made a brief on it and came to Paris to wreck the Summit quite apart from the U-2 incident.

Senator Lausche. Based upon your opinion or active knowledge, during this period, was there espionage practiced by the Soviets in our country?

Secretary Gates. Yes, there was.

Senator Lausche. Is that answer based upon your knowledge?

Secretary Gates. Based upon reports that I have read.

Senator Lausche. From the Central Intelligence Agency?

Secretary Gates. Or from the FBI.

Senator Lausche. In the Soviet, all things are hemmed in against an individual getting into proximity of their bases. Am I correct in that?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Lausche. Does that situation prevail in our country?

Secretary Gates. It certainly does not, Senator.

Senator Lausche. Then there is a tremendous difficulty in the ability of obtaining intelligence by our agents in the Soviet as compared to their ability, through their agents in our country?

Secretary Gates. That is correct, and there is obviously no reason for him to overfly the United States.

Senator Lausche. Based upon the knowledge that you

acquired through the U-2's, what would be your opinion about our intellectual ability to properly pursue the development of our national defense?

Secretary Gates. I think we had a responsibility to take every means we could.

Senator Lausche. That is not my question. My question is if you did not have the knowledge acquired through the U-2, could you have intelligently developed your national defense to cope with the actual, potential military power of the Soviet?

Secretary Gates. By no means as well, Senator, by no means.

Senator Lausche. By no means whatsoever?

Secretary Gates. We have other means.

Senator Lausche. Yes?

Secretary Gates. That gives us other information, but this was a very important piece of information.

Senator Lausche. If you didn't have that information, do you feel that the security of our country in all probability would have been effected because of our inability to properly develop our military strength?

Secretary Gates. I think this was -- I want to be careful in my answer because this is one source of several sources of intelligence. It is a very important one. I think it would have been effecting our ability to properly defend the United States if we didn't have this information.

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Senator Lausche. Now, getting down to the matter of the May 16th meeting, have you formulated any opinion as to whether Khrushchev, when he left Moscow, already had prepared these four unacceptable demands that he made upon the President with respect to the U-2 incident?

Secretary Gates. Everyone is entitled to a personal opinion, Senator, and I have an opinion, yes, sir, that he had very definitely, because the moment he arrived in Paris he presented these conditions to Mr. de Gaulle along with a copy already in French.

Senator Lausche. That is the fact is that he was supposed to go to Paris on May 15th, the Sunday?

Secretary Gates. Yes. He came on Saturday night, I believe.

Senator Lausche. And for some reason that has not been explained he decided to come there in advance?

Secretary Gates. That is right.

Senator Lausche. On Saturday?

Secretary Gates. That is right.

Senator Lausche. And early in the morning at 11 o'clock on Sunday, he asked for a conference?

Secretary Gates. Attended by de Gaulle.

Senator Lausche. Attended by Malinovsky, himself, and de Gaulle?

Secretary Gates. That is correct.

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Senator Lausche. At that meeting, he set forth these unacceptable demands?

Secretary Gates. That is right, sir.

Senator Lausche. Then in the afternoon at 4:30 he asked for a conference with Macmillan?

Secretary Gates. That is correct.

Senator Lausche. And he again set forth those four demands?

Secretary Gates. That is correct.

Senator Lausche. This is merely asking for your opinion.

Do you believe that in self-respect and maintenance of the President's position he could conform to the demands made in that ultimatum?

Secretary Gates. I certainly do not. I certainly believe he could not, I guess, would be a better answer.

Senator Lausche. I am of the opinion that when he left Moscow he knew there was not to be a summit conference. He prepared his paper. He had his mode of operation completely outlined.

Secretary Gates. I share that point of view, Senator.

Senator Lausche. Now, you have stated that you did not feel that he could, in the face of these discussions about a summit conference, suspend our activities with respect to the security of the country, is that right?

Secretary Gates. That is right, sir.

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Senator Lausche. If there was to be a temporary suspension of these U-2 flights, when should they have begun? This is speculation. I am just trying to search it out. The discussions for a summit conference preceded by far the September visit in the United States, and then from September to May 16th you have September, October, November, December, four months, practically nine months. Should we last September have discontinued our U-2 flights?

Secretary Gates. Not in my judgment, Senator. I think it would have been most incorrect to have suspended them.

Senator Lausche. Do you believe the Soviet, because of the arranged Summit Conference, discontinued its activities?

Secretary Gates. I am sure they didn't, although I don't know, but I am perfectly sure they didn't.

Senator Lausche. That is all.

The Chairman. Mr. Reporter, your staff overlooked a document which should have been included in the background information. It is the Soviet note of May 10th, which was sent to our Government, together with the reply, as reprinted in the New York Times of May the 11th, and I ask that it be inserted in the record so that this step in the development from a documentary point of view may be complete.

(The document referred to is as follows:)



4           The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, referring just a moment to a previous question, on the May the 9th meeting in which the issuance of the statement by the Department was considered, were there any alternative statements proposed and considered to the one which was issued?

Secretary Gates. Not in principle, Senator Fulbright.

The Chairman. Not in principle?

take 8 fls       Secretary Gates. But there were, of course, various language versions considered.

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The Chairman. Did anyone at that meeting raise the point that for the President, the Chief of State to assume personal responsibility would be a departure from the historical practice of this country?

Secretary Gates. I think this was understood, Senator, and I believe that we felt the circumstances were different from anything that had prevailed heretofore.

The Chairman. But the point was raised and discussed?

Secretary Gates. I can't accurately say that it was raised and discussed but it was certainly in my mind and I believe it was obviously -- it was obvious to all of us that it was a departure from precedent.

The Chairman. It was a departure from precedent in this country. Do you know of any other country that has followed this policy?

Secretary Gates. No, I do not.

The Chairman. Did any one -- was any one concerned that this might have far-reaching implications for the future of our intelligence operations.

Secretary Gates. Well, we knew that it had -- it marked -- it already had marked the end of this particular method of collection of intelligence because of its being compromised,

The Chairman. Did I understand you to say that to your

knowledge there was no time in the last few years in which you are familiar with our activity that U-2 flights were suspended for political reasons.

Secretary Gates. Not to my knowledge, Senator, that is correct.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, were you ever consulted with regard to the wisdom of holding a summit conference?

Secretary Gates. No, I was not, Senator.

The Chairman. Do you personally believe there is any reasonable hope for any agreement with the Russians with regard to disarmament?

Secretary Gates. I think it is extremely doubtful, Mr. Chairman. I think that the Soviets are playing off and on again tactics, sometimes cool, sometimes cold, sometimes hot.

I believe that their proposal for disarmament or total disarmament is completely unrealistic and I find it rather difficult to believe they will ever agree to the controls and inspections that we will of necessity insist upon to make progress on disarmament.

The Chairman. Do you believe the same with regard to nuclear test bans?

Secretary Gates. I am not so definite on that, Mr. Chairman, from a personal point of view. We seem to have made more progress in the negotiations on tests than we have in the

other field. But I again worry about the possibility of having valid control and inspection systems for either of these efforts.

(At this point, Senator Gore entered the hearing room.)

The Chairman. I understood you to say, I believe, in answer to a question by Senator Morse that you did not believe any significant concessions could be expected from the Soviets at the summit meeting.

Secretary Gates. That is right. This has been consistent with my testimony before the committees of Congress all of this year.

The Chairman. Is it now probable that as a result of the revelation of the efficiency of the U-2 photography, that the Russians will now change the location of many of their strategic bases?

Secretary Gates. This is quite an undertaking. You don't build the construction that is involved in strategic bases easily or quickly, and they don't know precisely how much information we have about them, and I would think that they would perhaps take different means of building new bases or of dispersing bases or something of that character, but I don't believe that it is very practical to assume that they would shift major installations because of the character required to handle the strategic weapons.

The Chairman. What I meant is do you feel that the

information you now have may become rapidly obsolete because of their knowing you know about it they will change them, that you will have a great deal of difficulty in keeping up with their location.

Secretary Gates. We will have to augment other methods toward obtaining this information.



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Mr. Secretary, was your prepared statement released to the press?

Secretary Gates. Was what, sir?

The Chairman. The statement which you read initially, was that released to the press?

Secretary Gates. I didn't release it, unless the Committee did.

The Chairman. No, the Committee didn't, as far as I know.

Captain Johnston. It has been released by Mr. St. Claire; I believe that he had released it. We didn't release it.

The Chairman. Was it your purpose to release it?

Secretary Gates. It was up to you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Well, normally, the initial statement made by witnesses is the same as their own testimony, they either censor it or release it. I was just inquiring.

Secretary Gates. It is all right with me if it is all right with you that it be released, Mr. Chairman. I understand it has been released.

The Chairman. It has been released?

Secretary Gates. That is what I understand.

Captain Johnston. Yes, sir, I was informed by someone from the committee, I believe Mr. St. Claire, that it had been released.

The Chairman. By whom?

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Captain Johnston. By the committee, Senator.

The Chairman. May I ask the staff, did you release it?

Mr. Marcy. No, Mr. Chairman, this will just be released in the normal way. It is put on the tape here. It went through the censors and unless they took any portion of it out it went to the public.

The Chairman. I just was wondering.

Secretary Gates. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I considered it your prerogative. I have no objection one way or the other.

The Chairaan. It usually follows the same procedure, you make the statement and then it goes through the record and if the censors wish it, was this statement cleared with the State Department before you made it?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that we find out whether a copy was -- got in the hands of the newspapermen other than through our normal sources here.

Mr. Marcy. No, sir, that did not happen, not through the committee. Everything goes through the regular process, through the censors, and so on.

The Chairman. Well, I asked the clerk a moment ago if you had released it. He understood you had, I mean that you had given it to the press before.



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Secretary Gates. I didn't give it to the press,  
Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. You or one of your aides, I don't know.

Secretary Gates. No, we did not release it.

The Chairman. You stated very positively that you believed the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, before he came to Paris, had already made up his mind to wreck the summit. Can you tell us how and why you arrived at that opinion?

Secretary Gates. Well, I felt, again, and again speaking personally, I felt that the fact that he arrived on Saturday night and asked for these appointments with President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan and he arrived with a position paper translated in French in the case of de Gaulle and given orally by translation in English to Macmillan, a position paper that he used almost verbatim as the first part of his text the following morning, was pretty good indication that he had a preconceived plan at the summit meeting and was planning to, in my judgment again, and used the fact that there were 3,000 newspapermen in Paris and he had a platform to issue all of these statements from. Then I believe there were indications in other speeches that he made prior to the Summit that he was going to adopt later on.

The Chairman. What in your opinion caused him to arrive at this conclusion to wreck the conference?

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Secretary Gates. Why, I believe that he found that he had been unsuccessful in creating any disunity among the allies, and that he was not going to get any substantive concessions himself, according to his terms, on Berlin and other critical issues that he might consider important, and that he wasn't going to get a blanket disarmament check without controls and so forth, and I believe he felt that he was not going to make any progress at the Summit.

The Chairman. Do you believe the U-2 incident contributed to that belief?

Secretary Gates. I, frankly in my judgment it did not, Senator Fulbright. I believe it gave him, it contributed to his public case, but I don't think it contributed to his position.

The Chairman. You don't think that was a significant element in causing him to arrive at this conclusion?

Secretary Gates. I really do not, no, sir. I believe it was a factor in his, an important factor in helping him make his case, but I don't think it had anything to do with his policy decision.

The Chairman. Why do you think he would be better off and what reasoning leads you to this conclusion, why is he better off having followed the course he did, than having gone to the conference and having it result in no concessions?

Secretary Gates. Only he can answer that, Senator.

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The Chairman. Why do you think he left in his initial statement what is called an "out" for the President, by saying he thought the President didn't know about this?

Secretary Gates. I don't know what his intentions were about that, whether that was an out or whether that was just a statement that he believed. I really don't know.

The Chairman. If it was an out, it would be inconsistent with his determination to wreck the conference, would it not?

Secretary Gates. Sir?

The Chairman. If it was an out as it has been alleged, it would be inconsistent with his determination to wreck the conference. He wouldn't want to give the President an out, would he, if he --

Secretary Gates. I never personally considered it was an out. I just thought he was using this as part of his speech -- I don't consider it was an out.

The Chairman. Well, he did say that he thought the President didn't know about it, didn't he, in his initial statement?

Secretary Gates. Yes, he did.

The Chairman. My time is up.

Senator Morse, do you have any further questions?

Senator Morse. Senator Wiley is next.

The Chairman. Senator Wiley?

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Senator Morse. I have some more questions.

Senator Wiley. Mr. Secretary, we know very well that he had canvassed the situation with Macmillan, de Gaulle, with Adenauer, and with our President, and they were all agreed and firm on the proposition that Khrushchev wanted, to wit, he wanted to divide Germany, and so forth and so on. Now, he was acquainted with that fact from his conversation, was he not?

Secretary Gates. I believe he was, sir.

Senator Wiley. And, in other words, he knew that if he went to the conference and couldn't get his way, which would be very apparent, that wouldn't sit so well with the people of Russia?

Secretary Gates. I think that is a good speculation.

Senator Wiley. So, it seems to be the consensus of those people who claim to know, including yourself, that the U-2 incident would give him something to hang on his previous determination and that he utilized. Do you agree to that?

Secretary Gates. Yes, I think he used the U-2 as a tool rather than as a matter of principle. I think he decided that there was no progress for him at the Summit.

Senator Wiley. Well, there is just this one other question. I think you have answered it, but see if I can't get it out into the open and get it so there won't be any question: Is it your opinion that he had known of the U-2

7 incidents for a long time, I mean the U-2 flights.

Secretary Gates. I think he -- I think I believed him when he said that he knew we were overflying the Soviet Union. I don't believe he knew their capabilities. But I think he knew that unidentified aircraft were over his territory.

Senator Wiley. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

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The Chairman. Senator Morse?

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, I want to pursue a bit further the line of questioning that I was conducting when my time was up because I think you have got to deal also with the problem of where do we go from here, in view of Russian attitudes at the present time.

We have the Air Marshal's statement now which has not been countermanded as far as we know by Khrushchev, that if an American U-2 plane flies from any base, goes over Russia, they will fire a missile against that base.

Your testimony I think justifies my concluding that if they fire at that base, that our commitments under NATO, our obligations to defend our Allies, we will meet that force, and that that may very well start general war.

As I understand also your testimony, you share my doubt as to whether or not the Air Marshal is bluffing, whether or not this is propaganda in the cold war or whether or not this is an announcement of a definite decision as to what they are going to do.

So we have to discuss this hypothetically from this point on. Let's assume that he means exactly what he said, and because of my fear of the type of military mind they have in Russia as contrasted with our own, namely, the different between amoral military leaders and moral military leaders, I am very fearful that the group in control of the Russian military at the present

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time mean exactly what he says.

They will fire a missile at any base from which an American U-2 plane flies. Doesn't that put squarely up to us then the question as to whether or not we can justify being a party indirectly to the starting of general war by flying any U-2 planes from any foreign base, in view of that announcement by the Russian Air Marshal?

Secretary Gates. We have announced that the U-2 flights will not be resumed. The President has announced this. This is, of course, known to them and that was announced prior to this Defense Minister's statement that you refer to.

Senator Morse. That is what I want to clarify for this record because most respectfully, I don't think it is clear in the record that this Committee has made to date.

The President has announced at Paris that they were suspending them.

Secretary Gates. He made the statement, Senator, that he couldn't commit the next President, but as far as he was concerned, during his Administration, the flights were stopped.

(At this point in the proceedings, Senator Cooper leaves the hearing room.)

Senator Morse. Then do you wish to express the viewpoint that at the present time the United States does not intend to continue any U-2 flights over Russia?

Secretary Gates. I think we made a commitment not to.

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Senator Morse. There has been a considerable amount of discussion in these hearings and outside of these hearings that in view of that situation that confronts us, it is intended to continue U-2 flights; that the President's statement was a statement made in connection with the Summit Conference situation.

The Summit Conference situation having blown up, it does not follow that that statement of the President now continues in effect.

It is your testimony that it is your understanding it does continue in effect?

Secretary Gates. I am not a lawyer, Senator, but I think you could take the legal point of view that the President had no commitment because of the blow up of the Summit Conference, but from a national point of view, prestige and the standpoint of the honorable point of view, I think the United States has made a commitment regardless of the technicality of the timing of the decision, so that in my judgment we have made a commitment not to fly U-2 during the Administration of this President.

Senator Morse. I don't care to get into any argument over semantics, but only judging from what I read about the interpretation of the President's speech to the nation.

There are many news comments interpreting the President's speech to the nation as a speech that does not commit this



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nation to a discontinuance of U-2 flights, now that the Summit Conference has blown up.

I think it is very important that we make clear our position. I am not passing judgment now on what our position should be.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Morse. But we have problems, may I say most respectfully with people in other parts of the world, even including the segments of the population of our Allies, raising the question as to whether or not the President's speech to the nation the other night means that we may continue U-2 flights.

In view of the statement of the Air Marshal of Russia as to what they are going to do if they do continue, my question is this: Should not our government restate its position in regard to the continuation of U-2 flights and give the world assurance at the present time that we do not intend to continue U-2 flights, and thus risk the possibility that the Russians may send a missile to the air base from which any U-2 flight might leave?

Secretary Gates. Senator, I have in my hand the President's statement in Paris in which he said:

"In point of fact, these flights were suspended after the recent incident, and are not to be resumed. Accordingly, this cannot be the issue."

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That is a categorical statement that they are not to be resumed. This is what I understand our position is.

Senator Morse. The President didn't say that in his speech to the nation the other night. There isn't anything in the President's speech to the nation the other night that categorically and unequivocally assures to the world that we are discontinuing as a matter of espionage policy, the flying of any U-2 planes over any foreign territory.

All I seek to do at this point in the record, and please let me assure you of this, all I see to do is to raise this point so that our government can remove any suspicion or fear in other parts of the world, in view of the Russian Air Marshal's statement, that the world doesn't have to be concerned about a nuclear war being started by us, by sending a U-2 plane from any foreign base over Russia.

I think the world is entitled to that assurance at this moment in order to produce the relaxation that I think is necessary for the continuation, through the United Nations I hope, of a good faith, this attempt to reach some understanding with Russia.

Secretary Gates. It may well need clarification, Senator. I didn't think it did. I thought it was perfectly clear to me that we had made a commitment so long as the President is in office, not to fly the U-2 airplane, and everyone understood it. If they don't, perhaps it should be reexamined. However,

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you are now faced with making another statement in face of a threat, and I don't know whether this is a wise move or not.

Senator Morse. I think it is a wise move if we honestly believe that this is more than a threat, that this is an announcement of military policy that they intend deliver on.

I don't intend to argue the point. I think the judgment of the world will be against us if, in view of what you call this threat, we should continue U-2 flights, because I think we have to share joint responsibility with Russia then for starting a nuclear war, because I seriously question whether world opinion will ever be with us on this kind of espionage conduct.

I think that world opinion is against our sending a U-2 flight over any foreign territory, because I think most people in other parts of the world consider it a form of constructive aggression.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper, do you have any further questions? I think you are next.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, with reference to the discussion which you have just had with Senator Morse, I think perhaps I only have a comment because my comment will go to a matter of personal opinion, but as I understand the line of questioning that has been going on here, and as I think it probably will be interpreted, the United States is required

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to take the burden for all the ills of the world and take the responsibilities for all the mistakes in the world, and we must do everything, including complete submission to the demands and the threats of the Kremlin and that the opinion of the world is apt to be slanted against us unless we do this at this time.

I have heard this from so many sources over the country, that we have got to do this or that or the other thing as a gesture that we are not war minded or that we are not war mongers, or that we really have some interest in our fellow man.

Now, if the record of the United States over the last good many years of humanitarian activities, of fantastic expenditures of billions of dollars for peace, of fostering all kinds of conferences, of making all kinds of offers to meet all kinds of reasonable propositions for peace, based only upon reasonable agreements for their assurance of being carried out -- if that isn't an assurance to the world, I personally think that to further humble ourselves by yielding to this threat of this military man in Russia would certainly not add to our prestige in the last, and it probably would be little use in the eyes of the world, at least those that we would expect to stand by us in an emergency.

I can't follow that line of reasoning, especially in view of the past record of the United States.

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We started out at the end of World War II with the sole and exclusive possession of the atomic bomb, the ability to blow any nation off the map and anybody else if we wanted to if we were war-minded. Nobody else had it. We offered to give it up to an international agency to get out of the atomic business, to turn over all fissionable materials to an international agency, all we asked was that reasonable inspection, reasonable assurance would be given that the international agency would have control and that no nation would cheat on this obligation.

Never in the history of the world as far as I know, has a nation, possessing the exclusive ability and the exclusive power to destroy any other nation in the world, have they ever given that up or offered to give it up voluntarily.

We go from that step by step with vast amounts of money, with all kinds of humanitarian offers, with all kinds of peaceful offers, with all kinds of peaceful efforts in the world and I just want to make my position clear, that we have stated we are not going to overfly Russia, at least so far as President Eisenhower's Administration is concerned, with U-2s, that that has been stopped, and I -- if we did continue it sometime in the future in the interestsof the security of this country, I think the security of this country comes first

in our responsibility, and we must take whatever reasonable means we have and whatever calculated risks that may be involved in order to secure essential information and in order to secure and maintain our proper defensive posture.

I feel that very deeply and I am not questioning you about it.

You don't have to agree or disagree. I merely wanted to make that statement in view of the fact that I don't agree that we have got to continually humble ourselves in the eyes of the world, because I think it can do nothing but destroy the confidence in many cases that other nations have in us if we continue to bow to the threats that emanate periodically from the Kremlin, and we have had just as bad threats in the past as this one, as I pointed out in my previous questions, where they said they have got rockets pointed at our bases, they have got rockets on the pads pointed at other countries in Europe, they know how many rockets they are going to put on Paris and that they are going to bury us one way or another, and so on, and I think there comes a time when even the world has to turn and stand fast. That is all I have to say.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.

The Chairman. Senator Gore?

Senator Gore.

\*\*\*Pages 623 through 627, inclusive, deleted.\*\*\*

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The Chairman. The Senator's time is up.

The Senator from Ohio, any questions?

Senator Lausche. No further questions.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I don't want to labor this too long, but I am interested in your reasoning. I didn't get to finish that question. What, in your opinion -- let me go back. Do you think when Chairman Khrushchev was in the United States last September that at that time he had an intention to have a summit conference?

Secretary Gates. I would only be speculating, Mr. Chairman. I think he did.

The Chairman. I want to know what happened between then and May the 15th, in your opinion, that caused him to take the firm decision which you stated a moment ago you believe he had.

Secretary Gates. I really don't know the value of my opinion, Mr. Chairman, but my opinion is that he has tried for many years to divide our allies from us. He has tried to divide the NATO membership in particular. He has resented the bases that surround his country, and he has had, I think, as a number one objective the division of our security and collective alliances. I think he found during this intervening period that he couldn't make a dent in the solidarity and unity of these relationships, that he couldn't

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get anybody to change their position on Berlin. He found the British and the French and the United States stalwartly together on that subject, and that he found the NATO alliance in good shape and strong, and that he was going to run into a position where he would make no progress, and as someone else has remarked, I believe, during this testimony, he would probably lose some face at home if he couldn't make any progress.

The Chairman. Do you think he would have refused to participate if there had been no U-2 incident?

Secretary Gates. I think he would have -- again, we must only speculate, Senator -- I think he would have probably employed tactics that would have ruined the Summit from within.

The Chairman. But you think he would have participated?

Secretary Gates. I think he would have participated and found some other mechanism of destroying it.





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The Chairman. Mr. Dulles testified that the Air Force gave CIA weather forecasts that were helpful to the U-2 operation, is that correct?

Secretary Gates. That is correct.

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The Chairman. What inference from Soviet military preparedness can properly be drawn from the U-2 incident?

Secretary Gates. This, pieced together and repeated and associated with other sources of intelligence builds up, unfolds a story that definitely disclosed a military posture.

It builds up a story that gives you a judgment on a capability for a surprise attack. It gives you a judgment on important installations. It gives you some judgment on production. It gives you some judgment on logistic back up and actual military sites, so that I would say it gave you a very definite looksee at their military posture.

The Chairman. Is it possible for you to give us a judgment? Was this preparation and strength very impressive?

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Was it greater than you had expected?

Secretary Gates. Coming into two recent jobs, I have had, which is the first time I was ever involved in this, I would say that it impressed me, Senator.

The Chairman. In other words, the result of your overflights and the information you got has given you an appreciation of their military strength better and that appreciation is that they are very well armed, is that correct, better than you expected?

Secretary Gates. In some case, yes. In some case, perhaps less well than they advertised.

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The Chairman. Does this failure of the summit and all that has resulted from it, has it given you any new ideas as to the level of expenditures of programs relating to defense?

Secretary Gates. Not immediately, no, sir. But I believe I have said when I started to testify in January, I repeatedly stated we didn't expect to have any significant or substantive concessions. We believed there was a tactic on the part of the Soviet Union. We didn't know how long it would last and were not basing our military programs on this premise and I also said that we should keep them under continuous review and as late as April we went back with a major revision in our military programs to the Appropriations Committees.

I believe now we should continue this careful and continuous process, and I have no desire right now to make any further recommendations to the Congress. The Senate Appropriations Committee are about to mark up the defense bill I believe next week or this week.

The Chairman. One inference I wish you would comment on that might have been drawn from the ordering of the test on May 15, I believe: Would it be fair to draw the inference that you had any doubt about the readiness of our Armed Forces.

Secretary Gates. No, sir, but it is a very good move and we should do it more frequently to have a no notice alert communications and command readiness test, and we hope to do this, I say we started one again last night which has been long planned, it is going to be about a 7 or 8 day exercise.

The Chairman. It has been long planned.

Was the one on the 15th long planned?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

The Chairman. When did you first think of doing that?

Secretary Gates. There was another one planned for about that period of time, as a matter of fact, I made the decision to do this myself.

The Chairman. After you arrived in Paris?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Do you think that that might have been construed as a provocative act under the circumstances that then existed in Paris?

Secretary Gates. No, sir, it was made after midnight

on Sunday night. It was not intended nor was it worded as a provocative message. The first word in it was "Quiet", and the last words in it were "minimum need to know."

It was not meant as provocative. It was not meant as either an offensive or defensive alert.

In fact it was not issued as such. If we were going to go on that kind of an alert we would have had a higher degree of readiness than the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued.

The Chairman. I didn't mean you intended it as such. Don't you think reasonable people might have regarded it as a provocative act?

Secretary Gates. I think reasonable people would have regarded it as a prudent act.

The Chairman. But not as a provocative act?

Secretary Gates. That is right.

The Chairman. My time is up. We have a new member here who has just come, would you care to ask any questions?

Senator Humphrey. Can I follow up on two or three of yours?



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The Chairman. You have ten minutes to do as you please.

Senator Humphrey.

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Senator Humphrey. Do you think it was essential to have overflights in order to gain the kind of information that is supposed to have been gained in recent months?

Secretary Gates. Yes, this was by all means our best information.

Secretary Humphrey. Well, it might be your best information.

Secretary Gates. Yes, I think it was essential, yes, I do.

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Senator Humphrey. Have we ever shot down any Soviet aircraft that have been over American territory?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

Senator Humphrey. Have we shot down any Soviet aircraft that have been over areas where we have some military responsibility?

Secretary Gates. Not to my knowledge.

Senator Humphrey. Not over Korea, Japan?

Secretary Gates. You mean in peacetime?

Senator Humphrey. Well, in the Armistice period.

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Secretary Gates. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

Senator Humphrey. We have not?

Secretary Gates. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator Humphrey. I had been informed once that we had, and that is why I had asked the question.

Secretary Gates. Maybe we ought to qualify this. There has been speculation that "volunteers" have flown aircraft that have been shot down. These volunteers may have been Soviet, but as far as I know any identified as a Soviet aircraft has not been shot down.

Senator Humphrey. Has the Soviet Union protested to the United States because of an attack on our part on Soviet aircraft?

Secretary Gates. I can't answer that question, Senator, because my knowledge is that they have not. I don't think they have. No, I don't think so, sir.

Senator Humphrey. Do you have reason to believe that the so-called volunteers might very well have been a little less than volunteers, possibly engaged actively in Soviet espionage?

Secretary Gates. Well, there has been sort of a technique involving over a period of time in various places of the world where volunteers have appeared and we have always been a little apprehensive about them.

Senator Humphrey. Just a little?

Secretary Gates. No, sir.

(Laughter)

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Senator Humphrey. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator Wiley?

Senator Wiley. None.

The Chairman. Senator Morse?

Senator Morse. I have a few more, Mr. Secretary, pursuing the same line of questioning I was pursuing before.

The President the other night in his speech to the nation indicated very clearly that a nuclear war would produce devastation upon all participants.

Going back to my hypothetical, assuming that we should fly a spy plane out of some foreign base and assuming that the Russian Air Marshal makes good on his threat and strikes that air base with Russian missiles and starts a general war, do you think we could win it?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Morse. You think we could destroy Russia and have enough of the United States left so that we could remain a power?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, because in this case he would, by initiating this attack, give considerable warning to our retaliatory forces and with that warning, we would move in.

Senator Morse. Your view then is that the United States could win a nuclear war?

Secretary Gates. If it is started under those circumstances.

Senator Morse. Do you think that the Russian military are aware of the fact that we could win a nuclear war if they started that war by simply sending a missile to one air base from which a spy plane might fly?

Secretary Gates. I think they are well aware of it.

Senator Morse. Do you think then that if he kept his threat of sending a missile to a foreign air base from which a spy plane might be flown, he probably would go much further than that and send missiles elsewhere and if he knows it is going to lead to a general war, start a complete general war?

Secretary Gates. I think he would have to.

Senator Morse. In your opinion, could we win that war?

Secretary Gates. Well, we could do what we call in the military, prevail in general war, but there would be great damage to the United States.

Senator Morse. There would be terrific mutual destruction in a general war?

Secretary Gates. Yes, terrific damage.

Senator take 13

Senator Morse. Therefore, --

Secretary Gates. But everything depends, Senator, on a lot of factors. If you vary any part of the equation you vary the answer. In other words, time of warning, reliability of missiles, ability to fire a salvo of missiles worldwide against deployed and U. S. forces at home and abroad. These factors and the accuracies of these weapons -- any one piece of this equation varies the answer.

Senator Morse. Therefore, referring most respectfully to Senator Hickenlooper's observation, do you think that we would be showing a sign of weakness, that we would be guilty of appeasement, that we would be surrendering to threats if we removed any doubt in the world at the present moment by notifying the world that we have no intention of using military aircraft espionage tactics henceforth either by CIA, by NASA, by the Defense establishment or by any other agency of the American Government?

Secretary Gates. Well, I wouldn't know quite how to answer your question, Senator, because maybe some of us that live so close to these things have a different understanding than the public has. It is so clear in my mind that the President has made a commitment not to fly these airplanes during his administration that I believe that the question becomes hypothetical, and I believe if it is clear to other people as it is to me that this is so, then it would be, I believe, stepping up to a threat. But if it is not clear,



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and I am incorrect in this, then I think we ought to take a look at it.

Senator Morse. I am so anxious to see to it that we make it crystal clear because I am very much concerned about world reaction to our present position. I think we are living in the moment now where we can stop an adverse world reaction, and I think we are living in a moment where there is great danger that a substantial segment of world opinion is going to go against us, unless we are willing to make crystal clear that we are not going to, through any agency of our Government, resort to aircraft espionage, because we are dealing here when we are dealing with espionage as you so very well, I think, described it yourself as being a form of activity that is a pretty ugly business.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Morse. And we all know that it isn't based on principles of truth. In espionage, you do what is necessary to protect your country, in espionage work, including deception and engaging in immoral acts.

Now, I don't think we humble ourselves. To the contrary, I think we put them on the defensive in world opinion if we say to the world: "Listen, we want the Russians to understand that they are going to have to assume full responsibility for any starting of a war. We have said and we repeat to the world that we have no intention of using aircraft in espionage work over foreign territory."

You think it is perfectly clear. I have just come from across the country and I can give you assurance that it isn't clear in my judgment in American public opinion today, and you have really got a segment of public opinion in this country that wants that assurance from the President, because they take note of the fact that in his speech the other night he wasn't even as definite as he was at Paris in regard to this matter.

Secretary Gates. Senator, under the American tradition, I would say that the President says he isn't going to overfly

4 Russia during his administration, any circumvention of that statement would not be in character with either the President or our country. To me, it is completely clear, but I respect your judgment.

Senator Morse. I may be completely wrong. My only point is that we can afford, it seems to me, as a nation that does seek peace, we can afford to reassure the world as many times as that when assurance might help the cause of peace, and in doing so I don't think we humble ourselves. To the contrary, I think we put Russia on the defensive. It will help us in my judgment to win the so-called battle of propaganda for peace and strengthen us in getting these issues into the United Nations. Of course I would say this. I think the President is to be commended for making clear in Paris that he is suspending U-2 flights -- that is what he said, U-2 flights,

I think he is to be commended for that, and I hope that those who seek to replace him will give the world assurance immediately that when any one of them is elected President that will be their policy, too, because if all this is is a moratorium for a few months, it is not going to strengthen America's position in world opinion. They want to know whether or not this is going to be the policy of the United States, because, in my judgment, if you continue espionage work by way of aircraft, you are going to lose the world opinion in southeast

5 Asia, Latin America, and Africa, the opinion of which America has got to win in the decades ahead to survive, because if that part of the world goes against us, it is only a matter of a few decades before we will cease, in my judgment, being a nation.

You have got to win to the cause of freedom those hundreds of millions of people, and you are not going to do it in my judgment if you let Khrushchev get by with a propaganda drive now that we are the ones that are committing a form of aggression by carrying out an espionage program. We don't like to face up to it but in my judgment that is going to be the verdict of those people.

The Chairman. The Senator's time is up.

Senator Gore?

Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, I understood you to say that the decision on the 9th that the President should assume full responsibility was a unanimous decision. Did I correctly understand you?

(At this point, Senator Morse withdrew from the hearing room.)

Secretary Gates. The statement that was issued was a unanimous paper. I think I am answering you yes.

Senator Gore. I wanted to give you an opportunity to affirm that, and you so do now.

You did not participate, I believe you told me, or you

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told the Committee in any conference between the 5th and the 9th.

Secretary Gates. That is correct.

Senator Gore. So you did not participate in a conference or in a communication between the Department of State, the President at Gettysburg, or otherwise, with anyone regarding the issuance of the statement which was issued on the 7th by Mr. Herter?

Secretary Gates. No, I did not.

Senator Gore. Which partially acknowledged the mission of the plane.

Secretary Gates. That is correct. I had no participation in that in any way.

Senator Gore. I believe that concludes my questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Lausche?

Senator Lausche. I want to explore a bit the course of conduct taken by Khrushchev after his visit to the United States, concerning his attitude especially on West Berlin and West Germany. Isn't it a fact that following his visit to the United States, there was shown by him a conciliatory attitude for a period of about a month or two? Are you able to answer that?

(At this point, Senator Humphrey withdrew from the hearing room.)

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Secretary Gates. My impression is about the same as yours, Senator, that there was sort of a tone of conciliation in the air.

Senator Lausche. We have had before this Committee the Antarctic Treaty that has been recommended.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Lausche. That was signed by the Soviet and by the United States.

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Lausche. And that, I think, was last December 1st. And there was progress made for a period on the matter of banning nuclear tests.

Secretary Gates. Yes, there was progress made.

Senator Lausche. In fact, there was more progress made during that period than there had been at any other time on that subject.

Secretary Gates. I think that would be fair to say, that it looked more hopeful.

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Senator Lausche. Now then, with respect to the impression on the world, we have advocated the banning of nuclear tests, the initiation of disarmament to be achieved through agreements that would make possible the honest discussion of those agreements, is that correct?

Secretary Gates. That is right.

Senator Lausche, May I have your view on what the position of the Soviet has been with respect to the consistency of its deeds with its talk on nuclear tests, and disarmament?

Secretary Gates. Well, I have not been as intimately involved as perhaps I should have been.

Senator Lausche. Well, the fact is that it spoke of banning nuclear tests and initiating disarmament but it wanted no supervision, control or circumstances that would ensure the discussion of the agreement.

Secretary Gates. That is right. We made very little progress on getting anywheres on all kinds of different proposals for any kind of valid inspection system.

Senator Lausche. All right.

Now, getting back to Khrushchev's treatment, isn't it a fact that on November 11 he issued a vigorous and acrimonious tirade about the purpose of the West Berliners to build a broadcasting station in West Berlin. Are you or are you not familiar with that?

Secretary Gates. I am not familiar with that, Senator?

Senator Lausche. On November 14 in a speech he brutally attacked Adenauer and the German Republic.

Secretary Gates. I remember the speech.

Senator Lausche. You remember that speech?

Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.

Senator Lausche. And there was some speculation in the minds of the people in our government as to what his purpose was in making that attack when ostensibly there was to be a conference to reach some agreement on West Germany and Berlin.

(At this point, Senator Humphrey left the hearing room.)

Now then, on December 1 he began repeating his threats that he would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Is it not a fact that his attack upon Adenauer and upon the German Republic and his purpose to sign a separate peace treaty was confirmation of the unmoveable position he took before he met at Camp David about West Berlin and East Germany.

Secretary Gates. Yes, I think it was. I think his position was well advertised, and we felt in the Department of Defense that we were living under a threat of a separate peace treaty at that time.

Senator Lausche. Then he has the Baku speech of April 25 in which he gave a harsher version of what he had been saying for months about East Berlin, West Berlin, and



the German Republic. That is in April, pretty close to May 16 and then we have those circumstances in which you point out that he had a translated paper originally written in Russian into French translation so that he gave it to --

Secretary Gates. DeGaulle.

Senator Lausche. DeGaulle. How did he present his paper to Macmillan?

Secretary Gates. My understanding, Senator, was that he didn't leave a paper with Macmillan. He talked from the same paper and it was translated through an interpreter to Macmillan verbally. This is my understanding.

Senator Lausche. Isn't it also a fact that during all of this time and especially in the several months preceding the conference, the supposed conference, the four powers stated that there would be no yielding on West Berlin, and our rights in West Berlin?

Secretary Gates. That is right.

Senator Lausche. In your opinion what was the primary thing that he was aiming for in the conference. I am speaking of Khrushchev.

Secretary Gates. You mean when he agreed to go to a summit conference?

Senator Lausche. And down to the end.

Secretary Gates. I testified that I think he thought he would have his way and make some peace treaty in Berlin with

some kind of give on the part of our allies and our allies refused to give.

Senator Lausche. All right. Now then, have you given any thought to why he revoked the invitation to the President to come to the Soviet land?

Secretary Gates. Well, again we speculate but in my opinion the last thing he wanted was for the President to travel around his country and be acclaimed and received by the population of Russia.

Senator Lausche. Do you think that he had flashes in his mind about the acclaim that Nixon got in Poland, and in other places?

Secretary Gates. He probably did.

Senator Lausche. And do you think that he kind of thought that there would be demonstrations for the President of the United States by the Russian people unparalleled anywhere?

Secretary Gates. I believe there would have been.

Senator Lausche. That is my honest conviction that he did not dare have the President meet the Ukrainian people and the normal Russian people, excuding the Communists in that trip to the Soviet and that is why the invitation was revoked.

Senator Wiley. Will the Senator yield?

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Senator Lausche. I yield.

Senator Wiley. I think there are some other facts there that fit into the picture that you have very dramatically given us.

Do you remember after he came to American he went back and he canvassed individually the various heads of the various states, and then he made a trip out East and he met Mao Tze-Tong?

It was after Mao Tze-Tong that he made that Baku speech. He made several other speeches, and if you remember the papers were pretty well-filled with the thought that the Chinese Communists were telling him and that at the time that he did go to Paris, that conditions were such that the evidence indicated the Chinese were in Russia and now all this bolsters up the conclusion that the Secretary has made, that it wasn't the U-2 incident. That was just something that he got ahold of as an ostensible reason.

The other was that he couldn't get his way and that, I understand, is your position.

Senator Lausche. I have nothing more to ask you. Thank you very much, Mr. Gates.

Senator Gore. If the Senator would yield, I would like to observe that I was in the Far East at the time President Eisenhower made his visit to India and other countries, and there was a tremendous favorable reception. It served the cause of our country magnificently well.

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I think it is a great loss to us that the President has been denied the opportunity to visit in the Soviet Union. It would have, in my view, been a great contribution. He is unquestionably a great exemplary influence for America, and I agree with you, Senator Lausche and Senator Wiley, that the denial of the opportunity of this visit is a great loss to us.

I do not know whether Mr. Khrushchev wanted it or did not want it. Everyone can draw his own conclusions there.

I wish now that the exchange visit had been arranged before the Summit Conference. Perhaps we would have had a different result.

Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, I would like to get a question --

The Chairman. The witness would like to make a comment.

Secretary Gates. I want to make a comment I sort of feel like making, Mr. Chairman. I think you know about this because you were there. I think everyone should be terribly proud of the dignity and character of the President in this Paris meeting.

I happened to be sitting next to him and it was a most remarkable performance of strength of character and dignity of any man I have ever seen.

Senator Gore. You might be interested to know that I immediately took the Floor and expressed such views, and I

do not believe you will find any member of this Committee --

Secretary Gates. I am sure of that.

Senator Gore. Has criticized the President's conduct while in Paris.

Secretary Gates. The purpose of my remarks were not intended to do anything but just make a statement. I know he has had remarkable support of not only the Congress and this country, but of all of our Allies too, the NATO meeting that followed the Paris meeting was a remarkable meeting.

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The Chairman. Is that all, gentlemen?

Senator Wiley. I want to express what you usually do, the appreciation of the committee for the fine work of the Secretary here this morning.

Senator Lausche. I did want to go into this speech of Senator Dodd where he points out how Communists took charge in the organizing of the meeting in New York of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. But I am not going to go into it.

The Chairman. I want to thank you for your very frank and candid responses and for the patience that you have shown in bearing with the committee in asking these questions. I think you have made a very useful record for the benefit of the committee, and I think we understand what has gone on much better than we did before you came up here, and I hope that the record, as censored by the proper authorities, will not in any way embarrass you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Gates. I hope not, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, before concluding the hearing I would wish to express to you my personal appreciation for the dignity, intelligence and discretion and the courage you have displayed and statesmanship during the course of this hearing.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

Senator Gore. Now I ask your unanimous consent to have printed in the record a chronology of events which I found exceedingly well done by Mr. Chalmers Roberts.

The Chairman. Without objection it is so ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

COMMITTEE INSERT

Senator Lausche. I would like to put into the record a copy of Senator Dodd's speech describing how this meeting in New York, on the phase sponsored by the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy but organized by Communists, was conducted.

The Chairman. Without objection so ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

COMMITTEE INSERT

(Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the Committee adjourned.)